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Jaroslav Kravcak




Location: Slovakia
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PostPosted: Sun 20 Jul, 2014 12:52 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Daniel Staberg wrote:
Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:

(...)
Also the concept of difficult terrain - why would it be so much less difficult for infantry, than it would be for horses? - even lightly armoured, when I imagine fighting in narrow rocky pass, I dont feel like I would be sprinting effortlessly around barely moving horses - would be something different being almoghavar, throwing javelins into horses stuck in mud. In the example of Mortgarten, given it was so difficult to advance on horse, with enemies maybe throwing logs and stones from afar, why should the contribution of close combat troops and halberd be so decisive? Why especially against mounted knights? Would they even be armoured and armed, if it was an ambush? Wouldnt they mostly dismount in such a difficult terrain, in an effort to storm enemy positions, or to bundle together to fend off enemies? How exactly would several hundred halberdiers defeat 2000 armoured fully equipped knights in any serious close and most propably chaotic individual combat without suffering greatly themselves?
(...)


There is indeed terrain which is equaly difficult for both cavalry and infantry but in other cases horses have a lot more trouble because of their weight combined with having four legs and the way their hooves handle certain types of terrain. Particularly when acting as a unit that depends on momentum (ii.e the cavalry charge) to be effective in combat. 16th &17th military writers such as Basta, Monteccucoli and Melzo all recognised that lancers needed flat and firm ground to deliver their charge effectivly. Pistol armed cuirassiers could be effectiv on more diffcult ground but still got into the same problem as the lancers when encountering trees and ditches.

The battle of Pavia is a good example of how terrain could be very difficult for cavalry while not impeding the ability of the infantry to fight against the cavalry. (Rather the opposit) The French Gendarmes found themselves with serious problems among the ditches, hedges and trees of the park while the Spanish and Landsknecht arquebusiers and pikemen were able to fully exploit the terrain to their advantage.

Another example is snow, during the battle of Uppsala (1520) an army of Swedish yeomen and peasants attacked a Danish force (including a large number of mercenaries as well as some pro-danish Swedes). The snow that fell during the battle gave the Swedes an advantage since the wet and heavy snow not only made firearms and artillery ineffective but it also cause sever problems for the Danish cavalry. The snow gathered in large clumps under the hooves of the horses "and soon both horse and man lay on the ground" to quote an eyewitness. The Swedes who fought on foot and relied on crossbows rather than firearms had no such problems and inflicted severe losses on the Danes.

At Morgarten the key terrain features was the slopes covered with woods on one side of the path and the marshy area around the stream and along the sea shore which restricted the ducal army to the path.


shows a small part of the middle of the battlefield around the so called Letziturm. Despite later day alterations you can still get an idea of the shape of slopes as well as of how dense the woods can get. Not cavalry terrain at all.



http://www.morgarten.ch/bilder/Karte%20schlachtweg.jpg

The difficult terrain meant that the Leopold's troops could not use their superior numbers to outflank the roadblock that the Swiss had established at Schafstetten. Instead the army was forced to halt while attempts were made to storm the Swiss position. At the same time poor tactical discipline caused the ducal troops to bunch together on the path which limited their ability to move and fight if attacked even more. When the Swiss charged down the slopes they achived almost complete surprise which was followed up with a hail of stone that injured men and horses as well as causing even more disorder in the ducal ranks. And from disorder it is only a small step to panic, particularly when there is no space to move or fight properly while your enemy has cut of your reinforcements and only line of retreat by dropping logs over the path. The Swiss had effectivly used terrain and suprise to render all the advantages of the ducal army useless, the collapse and rout of the ducal troops ensure the Swiss victory.

Now the terrain at Morgarten was far from easy for infantry, one of the first accounts of the battle describe how the Swiss wore special "irons" to gain a sure footing on the slopes. Like the peasants of Ditmarschen they had the skills and equipment to use their native terrain to full advantage. Without it the battle may well have been much harder for the Swiss.


Thank you for the scetches and the description. Happy One more question, that would be interesting: Were Austrians actually ready to face serious resistance at this location? (Or, in another words, were they marching fully ready for battle, in full armour and lances, ready to form up and deliver charge, cautious of potential enemy presence, or with some clear cut plan on what to do, if ambushed, or would they rather march without much caution, maybe similat to the situation of Burgundians at the battle of Morat, where the bulk of the army wouldnt be fully battle-ready at the critical moment.)

Regarding the battle of Pavia, it still reamins quite unclear to me, what was the scale of this defeat for french gendarmes. Were hommes d'armes singled out without their supporting archers and coustiliers, or would almost whole force of about 4000 cavalrymen be surrounded by imperialist army? Would whole gendarmerie be involved, or would most of them escape and only a handfull of most notable noblemen around the king be massacred? What was their condition, when they routed De Lannoys cavalry - have they regrouped for another charge, or did they continued to pursue the enemy? Were they maybe compelled to continue their charge forward by being already put under fire? Have they charged in in any orderly manner, or in smaller groups? In what state were they before supporting Landsknechts arrived to help spanish? (or in another words, what role would close combat weapons play in eliminating french cavalry, werent they mostly broken by that time?)

-------------------------------------------------

Regarding mentioned high status noblemen vs humble footmen, I find it very overstated. Sure it was a loss, if well trained warhorse, or knight, or both were killed, nevertheless in pure resource terms, they werent that hard to replace. There were plenty of noblemen around, at least at this stage (regarding 16th century french and their gendarmerie.), even with all the losses, there were still many more to be involved in ordonance companies in french wars of religion, that followed after italian wars. Id say it was about the same for Burgundians before. As for horses, in monetary terms, it was a great loss, but given their lifespan, they were in theory even more easily replaced, than warriors they carried. On the other hand, men in elite infantry units might have been much cheaper to equip and easier to train, nevertheless, they needed much time and experience before actually becomming perfectly working invulnerable automatons and loosing significant numbers of these experiences soldiers would be as hard to replace, if not harder, than nobles. Also, if they werent pure mercenaries, loss of these men also meant loss of economic potential. (James B. Woods in his book The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Wars of Religion gives average age of french noble cavalrymen involved to be still in their teens, while infantrymen were generally in their 30s-40s for example, this might speak about the average age for seasoned infantry at the peak of their performance, while for cavalry, these were mostly young noblemen, well trained for war, but going in without that much theoretical experince in actual combat, but still be reasonably good to do the job expected from them.) Also, many times losses of french gendarmerie in battles of italian wars are hard to even estimate, on the other hand it was considered unbearable, when some 800 noblemen fell on both sides at the battle of Dreux, so that both sides tryed to spare their nobility afterwards. (At least in theory), so its dubious for me, that french would be losing many hundreds of hommes d'armes per battle.

Regarding battle of Omdurman and charge of 21st lancers, good book specifically aimed at this episode of the battle Id recommend is The last charge: the 21st Lancers and the Battle of Omdurman. Its full of eye witness account. Nevertheless, I have never seen any description of it, that wouldnt agree, that they fell into trap set up by INFANTRY. There are some enemy cavalrymen mentioned in description, but otherwise, this simply doesnt fit in. For the most part this was indeed a trap, there were troops kneeling concealed in sunken riverbed and middle squadrons basically jumped straight into 12 lines of men presenting their spear straight up. (its still remarkable, that only 20 men died and 50 were heavily wounded in such a situation, basically most of killed were the ones, that were dismounted after hitting ground after jump and werent able to get up and dead were almost exclusively from 2 middle squadrons, while there were only few wounded at the wings, where terrain was better and enemy only 4 lines deep. Theres also a numbers of 120 horses lost, but this by itself would be the whole loss for the campaign, or some period of it, not for this action. Its really dubious, given, that anyone, who wasnt able to remount and ride through was as good as dead and there are only very few men in anecdotes, that escaped alive on foot, or were helped by other rider. Also, horses of killed riders might not have all been killed, but captured, if rider fell off, why would someone kill riderless horse in the middle of the fight? So I firmly believe, theres no reason for higher theoretical immediate casualties of horses than about 20.)
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Pieter B.





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PostPosted: Tue 22 Jul, 2014 12:28 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Sorry for side tracking this thread but has anyone got a good eye witness account of the battle of Dreux and the type of armor the infantry and cavalry wore?
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Tue 22 Jul, 2014 3:07 pm    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Pieter B. wrote:
Sorry for side tracking this thread but has anyone got a good eye witness account of the battle of Dreux and the type of armor the infantry and cavalry wore?


I must admit, that given many good battle analyses and descriptions, I read more second grace source materials to it, than actual eye witness accounts, but some good sources, at least from my perspective would cetrainly be:

The King's Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Wars of Religion
(author John Wood)

L'année 1562 et la bataille de Dreux: étude historique et militaire; extraits divers, correspondances officielles du temps
(Raymond de Coynart, 1894, so fairly old, but I dont think theres more detailed information compilation of this battle out there, one link, that should work: http://bibnum.enc.sorbonne.fr/omeka/files/ori...5a6ba.pdf)

And partial information with actual undistorted accounts as they were written could be compiled from period memoirs of people actually participating, many were mentioned in great and detailed battle description and further discussion in one of the topics on this forum, though I cant remember now, where exactly. But simple search od Dreux as keyword should yield many interesting results to read from people well funded to speak about it, with access to more sources, especially the ones, that would be hard to get for more details, also searching bibliography of above mentioned document and book.

As far as infantry/cavalry equipment, Id once again recommend topics mentioned above for many heavily footnoted and cited posts about it.

Also, not exactly the source spot on this battle, but interesting for its critisism of statement, that pistol armed cavalry had clear-cut and undisputed advantage over more traditional lance-armed cavalry in battles of french wars of religion, giving short analyses of most notable examples, Dreux included - for easier searching, the relevant part starts cca at page 290. (Would also be interesting to see, what others, more knowledgeable would have to say to it. Happy )
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Pieter B.





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PostPosted: Wed 23 Jul, 2014 2:56 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Thanks for that. Sadly it seems my university doesn't have it. I also can´t seem to find an English translation of Martin Du Bellay´s work
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Wed 23 Jul, 2014 8:01 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Well just to add two more rather not broadly known examples of battles, that for the most part dont fall exactly in the topic of non-pike armed infatry vs cavalry, Id like to present:

-battle of Kinsale 1601: http://www.historyireland.com/early-modern-hi...sale-1601/
(not much luck with getting actual accounts of this battle via free internet sources)

-battle of Pinkie-Cleugh 1547, namely action of english cavalry vs scots
(luckily, account of the battle by William Patten is available as part of Tudor tracks here, for example: https://archive.org/details/tudortracts00polliala
I find his description of cavalry action very interesting, as it does show difficulties that they had to face regarding terrain and it really doesnt show, what is generally described in popular sources - innumerable carnage of english cavalry with zero effect on the scots, it rather seems, like despite no armour and charging in very unorderly manner through difficult terrain, they did manage to even get among scots though not through the whole formation and had to retreat afterwards, suffering casualties, but nowhere near the adjectives used in most vague descriptions. It also contains some accounts of individuals and manner of their conduct, or death in battle, just as nice some nice details of dangers faced from routed enemies still determined to harm.)

As to the topic, especially regarding previously mentioned lancers of 18th/19th century and their reach advantage, it seems the real reach of lances, as used, was very short, maybe bordering longer swords, so pure reach advantage wasnt a factor against bayonets, if presented forward utilizing their maximum reach. Here is an example of polish lance drill:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkXMkJ1rBhg

In the abovementioned battle of Dreux rallied huguenot horsemen conducted last charge of the day against french veteran infantry, lack of usable lances at this point was considered one of the factors, why they couldnt breach inside and make any greater impression. It was indicated, that much of this infantry might be armed with shorter polearms, rather than pikes, apart from missile weapons.

So shorter polearms/bayoneted muskets in tight formation would offer similar level of protection against short weapons of cavalrymen, even lances as used by 19th century lancers, or maybe Normans at Hastings and many other examples, as pikes would against long couched lances/maybe kontoi of earlier cataphracts in my view, so unless formation was breached in some way, cavalrymen could only ride around harmlessly. On the other hand, if they possesed long lances against shorter halberds etc., they would have one more option of trying to use their reach advantage to harm infantrymen, even without the need to breach formation, while staying out of danger, maybe hitting them with lance as they rode by to their side, turning it and snapping away after hit to use it more, than once, so they could be grinding stout infantry without much danger to themselves, even if formation itself was still in perfect order, even creating gaps like this. This might be what have happened at the battle of Laupen, though maybe there are sources detailing how engagement of burgundian knights vs swiss halberdiers went without the need to speculate like this.

Pieter B. wrote:
I'd like to jump into this discussion because it interests me and I think I can provide a few snippets of information here and there.

First off the whole "horses are not stupid and won't charge into a solid formation" seems to stem from a lindybeige video which has been endlessly parroted. Matt Easton another guy who also makes youtube videos and has a lot more knowledge on the subject has stated before that it is rubbish. In a few of his videos he reads eye witness reports from the 18th and 19th century where British cavalry in colonial India charged musket formations head on. One of the accounts is from Churchill himself I believe.

Now coming back to the whole "horses aren't stupid" thing. I asked around and talked to a horse owner on natural horse behavior and such. What she was able to tell me was that charging into a group of persons is indeed not NATURAL horse behavior but something you have to train. We all know horses frequently do unnatural stuff, just look a dressage competition once and tell me that's what wild mustangs do all the time Wink

This training could very well be the influencing factor that makes up the enormous difference in the cost of a riding horse and a war horse. Now I can't cite the exact paragraph where it is mentioned but I do know that a German (experimental) archaeologist attempted to train a horse to charge a roman formation. I believe it took him 6 months to train a horse to do that which is a long time. This of course was in perfect conditions so not battlefield sounds to startle the horse, no arrows whizzing around and hitting the animal. For folks who can read German and happen to have the book from Marcus Junkelmann; Die Reiter Roms you can probably find it in the book.

(some additional info)
http://www.plekos.uni-muenchen.de/2006/f-kavallerie1.html

The final thing I would like to add is that there are a lot of accounts from Both the Italian Wars and the later wars between Sweden and Poland where lancers are described as charging into and routing an enemy pike formation. But with enormous losses in horses even when successful. When the charge failed a lot of riders also died. basically it's almost never economical to charge an unharmed formation for pikes. Even you managed to rout the enemy and win the battle the unit might not see service again in the war due to a loss of horses.


Actually the quote of horses arent stupid and never ever will charge into any group of men might have been used for the first time in Keegans Face of battle and its used abundantly in anglosaxon books on ancient warfare, literally to the word, if it mentions cavalry failing to break infantry somewhere in the text. But it might be even older, hard to tell, it just seems he is the one, that came up with this formula as first, demonstrating its validitity at few most well known battle exmaples, all involving british.

As for time it took to train a horse to charge infantry line in the example, it seems good because its long and conservative, but I find it misleading. If I was to learn how to design a car from scraps, just by looking at one, or two, it would take ages to come up with some concept, it might be better, if I tryed it several times and even better, if there was someone to teach me everything about car design up to this point in first place. If they ever trained horses to ram into groups of people, then it most propably had methodology and tradition, that was passed by through generations and getting better with each try, while he simply started with simple goal and no practical experience, or advice about how to do it. So Id say its fair to assume the time it took for an average horse to be accustomed to ramming and pushing people around would be much shorter under experienced contemporary trainer. There also wouldnt be any social and ethical limitations, that would burden any effort to make horse kill and maim people today, not for methods to achieve this. (Of course its all speculation, but I find it all highly propable.) All of this of course only if it really was ever considered in training and I have seen no real proof of it. If examples of 19 century cavalry are to followed, it seemes the apex of their skills would be to overcome natural obstacles on horse with ease and quickly, like hedges, high walls etc. and at least for the incident at the battle of Aliwal it seems horse of an officer, that broke into square was considered not trained well enough, because he ran into the enemy, rather than swerwing to the side, as done in training, so it seems, that avoiding contact with unwavering infantry was already trained into troopers and their horses and not considered that much. (Though Nolan in his book on Cavalry and its history expresses quite clearly that he envisiones horsemen smacking into enemy formations, even though for quite a loss, especially from gunfire and even gives examples of several instances, when one cavalry unit was used as bait for infantry to fire upon, suffering heavy losses and the second one going after it came, broke and massacred the infantry, he also states, that major problem with cavalry not breaking squares is, that theres no rationale for training it in first place, cavalrymen are simply told they cant do it. For me its really interesting reading: https://archive.org/details/cavalryitshistornola)

As far as enormous losses, most of already mentioned examples shown, there are no enormous losses, if yes, then they go both sides. Most horsemen, it seems will avoid contact with infantry armed with polearms/bayonets/protected by terrain, or man made obstacles/ready to fire volley into them. In most examples, one of them dared to push his luck and succeded, sometimes it meant complete disintegration of infantry formation for the loss of single horseman, sometimes infantry stabilized only suffering considerable losses, with cavalry suffering as well, or not even this, most important thing to consider is, that in any case horsemen cramming into such a weak spot would be hugely outnumbered and not in position to physically eliminate whole infantry force, if they put their discipline together. Apart from mentioned 19th century examples, battles like Dreux, Ceresole, Grandson, Pinkie Cleugh, Klushino arent really examples of cavalry breaking infantry formations, rather of cavalry managing to break INTO formations and damage them. Even then I find adverbs used to describe their losses as too harsh, real numbers are nessesary, not empty term like immense, horrendous etc. and these terms generally invoke the picture of hundreds of dead horses and men for no damage to the enemy, while real numbers, that can be found are off any magnitude of this, still quite significant casualties, but not the picture of carnage these invoke. (Patten gives 26 gentlemen dead of the ones, that managed to get into contact with the enemy, as for the battle of Ceresole, one solid number I was able to find was 60 gentlemen killed in battle mentioned by de la Noue, but it isnt clear, if all of them were really with d'Enghiens cavalry, some might be the ones lost in infantry fight - it might be said, that remarks as to their status after the battle say they lost much more, than 50, maybe 66 percent of their strengh - namely one sentence of Montlucs description, out of my head - but its really nessessary to remember. there were maybe not more than 300 of them involved, about 100 being noblemen volunteers, not proper profesionals, charging veteran infantry 5000 strong with huge firepower and still managing to break in and still be strong enough to make them lay down their arms and surrender to them, when infantry from other part of the battlefield arrived to help, so i dont see any indivation of them being completely destroyed and doing no damage, despite being outnumber in range of 20-30:1 and facing 2000 firearms, if Montlucs ennumeration of their strengh is correct, as for the battle of Dreux, while huge catholic losses of noblemen are generally mourned, huguenot gendarme casualties are nowhere mentioned as being of any notable number in fight against the Swiss, only Swiss sturdy resistance if deemed worthy of note, not their killcount.- but most are numbers from anecdotal sources, would be interesting to see, if someone went into pain of counting actual casualties from period records, I havent seen such an effort yet - maybe the best example from this perspective from aforementioned battles might be Klushino, at least Radoslaw Sykora seems to compile his casualty numbers from period documents, also loosely hinting at most propable injuring, or killing weapon - losses - dead and wounded - amounted to several dozens maybe in men and up to 2-3x in horses in worst case for all companies charging said infantry, but most of these, if not almost all were carried out by firearms and infantry was supported by mercenary cavalry, covered by fences and most propably by so called kobylice - structures similar to pallisades with sharpened wooden spikes as well - good to note, that many hussars would dare to jump through them, even though designed to deter from this, according to some remarks, most of the riders daring to do this would jump in and never return, amassing some more losses, so it certainly wasnt the case of exclusively pike armed infantry facing cavalry out in the open, just as it wasnt a case of hussars breaking them, nevertheless, if numbers are to be trusted, despide all advantages and firepower, foreign formations - cavalry and infantry combined would suffer significant casualties as well, much more, than attacking hussars it seems- not all were infantry, just like not all hussar casualties must have been from their fight with infantry. As for the battle of Grandson, Id say de Commines is almost to the point stating only about 7 men at arms would be lost, certainly not hundreds and most propably not tens of them, it seems most of these casualties, just as most of the casualties Swiss suffered from them would come from the abovementioned action, while for the rest of the battle, most burgundian cavalry wouldnt make physical contact with the enemy and most losses would amass from missiles exchange. Light internet search of documents relating nobleman families, that would include the information about the deceased and the way and place of death yielded 2 results in my own search and one of them was already mentioned Louis de Chatel-Guyon. Overall, I believe, Swiss were on the trajectory to loose this battle in the same way to the battle of Marignan, or Biccoca had not luck intervened and most of the Burgundian casualties would be unfortunates injured in battle and forgotten there in panick to be finished off, or stragglers, that didnt manage to get out without being spotted. If nothing else, burgundian certainly havent ceased to exist as effective fighting force, it was their work, that most of the army got out of there in one piece, despite huge losses in material.)

EDIT: I found the aforementioned interesting discussion, regarding battle of Dreux:
http://www.myArmoury.com/talk/viewtopic.php?p...mes#216825

And one older discussion with similar topic of non-pike weapons usage vs cavalry:
http://www.myArmoury.com/talk/viewtopic.php?t...mp;start=0

both very interesting reading. Happy
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Pieter B.





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PostPosted: Fri 01 Aug, 2014 3:24 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Well I am now halfway through the reading of the 1864 article/book and it's really interesting.

However he seems really adamant against heavy cavalry and thrash talks napoleons cavalry into the dirt. I recognize that the cavalry of Frederick the Great was both better in quality and better led/used, but was Napoleonic cavalry so rubbish as the author claimed? Did he truly just waste cavalry but throwing it against the enemy in endless waves until they finally collapsed?

And last; He also notes how Stradiots managed to beat French Gendarmes in combat which seems like an exaggeration to me, did I miss something?
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Sat 02 Aug, 2014 7:46 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Daniel Staberg wrote:
There is indeed terrain which is equaly difficult for both cavalry and infantry but in other cases horses have a lot more trouble because of their weight combined with having four legs and the way their hooves handle certain types of terrain. Particularly when acting as a unit that depends on momentum (ii.e the cavalry charge) to be effective in combat.


This is a very important point. Cavalry manuals and cavalrymen's memoirs up until the 1970s (when the Portuguese used cavalry effectively against Angolan insurgents) often mention that cavalrymen in single file could usually go almost anywhere the infantry could walk, but their fighting performance in difficult terrain was much more seriously impaired than the infantry's. The cavalry's advantage lay in its ability to perform a rapid mounted approach, then attack dismounted, and finally mount back up (or send in a mounted reserve) for the pursuit. In counter-insurgency operations this often surprised guerrillas who thought that the cavalry could only fight mounted.
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Brian Nelson




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PostPosted: Sat 02 Aug, 2014 9:42 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

In an attempt to answer the original post:

First: I would say that the lack of cavalry in their culture was due more to a preference for infantry than an infantry that could beat cavalry well. The north cultures were always famously in favour of heavy infantry in the form of shield walls.

Second: I'm sure a shield wall is a VERY effective defense against light/medium cavalry. We are going back to the time before the huge destriers and armoured knights. As some have mentioned, YES, a very well trained horse can be made to charge home into a wall of shields/pikes, but a horse that has not been trained to do so will not. When presented with a wall of wooden shields, no horse that hasn't been explicitly trained to charge home will do so.

So I think we have some misconceptions. I think the specific situation originally described is really more of a cultural paradigm than any circumstance brought about by battle. Also remember that when the cavalry was lighter and the horses not so large or fearsome, the ramming cavalry charge wasn't really an option. Cavalry were used for scouting, flanking, and routing. For the most part.
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Sat 02 Aug, 2014 10:23 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Lafayette C Curtis wrote:
Daniel Staberg wrote:
There is indeed terrain which is equaly difficult for both cavalry and infantry but in other cases horses have a lot more trouble because of their weight combined with having four legs and the way their hooves handle certain types of terrain. Particularly when acting as a unit that depends on momentum (ii.e the cavalry charge) to be effective in combat.


This is a very important point. Cavalry manuals and cavalrymen's memoirs up until the 1970s (when the Portuguese used cavalry effectively against Angolan insurgents) often mention that cavalrymen in single file could usually go almost anywhere the infantry could walk, but their fighting performance in difficult terrain was much more seriously impaired than the infantry's. The cavalry's advantage lay in its ability to perform a rapid mounted approach, then attack dismounted, and finally mount back up (or send in a mounted reserve) for the pursuit. In counter-insurgency operations this often surprised guerrillas who thought that the cavalry could only fight mounted.


To be more specific, I rather meant difficulties of individuals, not whole fighting formations. Some features of terrain, like running up steep hills are said to even favour horses, regarding pure speed, elevation hampering mens mobility much more, than that of horses. And horses can certainly overcome natural and man made obstacles, that would stop approach on foot without any hope to come straight through - even kobylice and fences, as at Klushino, many cavalry exploits against infantry werent managed by smacking straight into them, their pikes, or bayonets, but jumping over their heads, or in some cases front rows of pikes. Nolan, for example calls for horsemen being as lightly armoured as possible and being well trained in easily jumping any obstacle, practicing contantly in rough terrain, praising actual, or supposed exploits of cavalry in the past, while criticising, among other points, current state of english cavalry (writing cca at the time of Crimean and Anglo-Sikh wars), especially dragoons (though he is picking up much more on continental cavalry, cuirassiers at most) and their lack of horsemanship, compared to irregular cavalry they met in contemporary conflicts.

To show some of this in video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nOyvimZuF5o
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZK3Dk4ROkA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbK1Yp2YnKY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-Fe4dryTC8
(There was one of a horse jumping on and through the barn, but I cant find it now.)

Whole formations of cavalry might need huge space to perform an ordered and effective charge, but after looking into it, I doubt single horse needs more, than few strides to get going at great speed, or that skilled rider on well trained horse wouldnt be able to evade footmen trying to run to him to strike him down in difficult terrain, if he has at least some space, so individual horsemanship would make great difference, Id say. Fighting in small groups of horsemen, fit for how much space they have to maneuver at certain location and supporting each other, they might not be overly effective in difficult terrain, but why shouldnt they at least be able to survive against enemy heavy in close combat weapons? If I imagine a battle in a narrow mountain pass, I dont really picture it as being one of big formation vs big formation, but rather of small groups, or individual duels. Id say it boils down to riders and horses quality of training and cooperation

So the question might be: All being the same at the battle of Mortgarten, just substituting austrian knights with same numbers of roman legionaires, would these be more mobile and loose it less decisely, or even win?

As far as cavalry closing in and dismounting, does this accounts for gunpoder/modern combat era, or as a whole? It seems pretty logical to dismount in difficult terrain to shoot at the enemy, rather than try to close in, hampered by terrain, being shot at from safe location, I also believe, that a man with missile weapon in difficult terrain will have a clear edge against any horseman, no matter how well trained. There also are examples of even heavily armoured cavalrymen dismounting to fight on foot, if stopped by some sort of fieldworks in difficult terrain, but would this really be the most effective and advisable way of fighting even in earlier era? Like heavily armoured knights dismounting and advancing uphills against entrenched enemy?

I also find notion of cavalry riding somewhere and then dismounting, forming up as infantry and attacking the enemy as rather odd. If they are to act as dragoons, dismouting and proving missile support, like maybe was the original idea for archers of ordonnance companies, it seems reasonable, maybe even mounting few pikemen to give them some close support, or, regarding any other cavalry, maybe dismounting to occupy advantageous location, like village (like Poles at the battle of Hodow vs Tatars), but dismouting and advancing forward to meet enemy in close combat on foot? What about horses in the rear? - easy target to be taken by enemy, unless significat portion of a force stays to guard them. What about the time it takens to dismount and approach enemy on foot, how can that catch them off guard and unable to respond? And the dismounting itself in close proximity to the enemy might cause more harm, than good, battle of Monthlery might be a good example of what a confusion can cause, though this time the confucion was caused by remounting, not dismounting of burgundian force, which was eventually overwhelmed in disorder and routed.

As for Nolans book, for one contemporary view on it and similar tracts praising exlusively light cavalry and the criticism of this approach, Id recommend this book (It also discards mentioned one gendarme made prisoner per stradiot, which isnt even there to be found and the ridiculous statement of the Swiss chasing, catching and massacring french gendarmes, because they were so heavy, havent weighted ideal 10-20 stone as he envisions, and werent promptly made into foot soldiers once being too fat for him - though to make him some justice, passage containing this historical incursion wasnt written by Nolan himself, but only transcribed from another author, he doesnt seem to object though):
http://books.google.sk/books?id=gTRYAAAAcAAJ&...mp;f=false

(In my opinion, even though his remarks on heavy cavalry are ridiculous in some places, the main point he tryed to make was perfectly valid, when applied to the battlefield of his era.)

And I also just realized I forgot to post a link to the book arguing clear cut advantage of pistol armed reiters vs lance armed gendarmes in french religious wars, I apologize for that.(about page 290) Evil :
http://books.google.sk/books?id=Ss7PowZFPC0C&...mp;f=false
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Benjamin H. Abbott




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PostPosted: Sat 02 Aug, 2014 11:09 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
So the question might be: All being the same at the battle of Mortgarten, just substituting austrian knights with same numbers of roman legionaires, would these be more mobile and loose it less decisely, or even win?


It would overwhelmingly come down to the people involved, but I don't see much reason to think Romans would do better under the same circumstances. Few if any armies do well against an ambush from above.

Quote:
I also find notion of cavalry riding somewhere and then dismounting, forming up as infantry and attacking the enemy as rather odd.


English men-at-arms tended to do this during the Hundred Years' War, except that they did their best to avoid having to advance on foot.

Quote:
And I also just realized I forgot to post a link to the book arguing clear cut advantage of pistol armed reiters vs lance armed gendarmes in french religious wars, I apologize for that.(about page 290)


The funny thing is that French men-at-arms with lances perhaps had their last glory days during the Wars of Religion. While they may not have been the most economical option and had mostly disappeared by the end of the century, men-at-arms with lances proved potent on the battlefield during that period - especially during the first phases, such as Dreux 1562.
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Sun 03 Aug, 2014 8:10 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Whole formations of cavalry might need huge space to perform an ordered and effective charge, but after looking into it, I doubt single horse needs more, than few strides to get going at great speed, or that skilled rider on well trained horse wouldnt be able to evade footmen trying to run to him to strike him down in difficult terrain, if he has at least some space, so individual horsemanship would make great difference, Id say. Fighting in small groups of horsemen, fit for how much space they have to maneuver at certain location and supporting each other, they might not be overly effective in difficult terrain, but why shouldnt they at least be able to survive against enemy heavy in close combat weapons? If I imagine a battle in a narrow mountain pass, I dont really picture it as being one of big formation vs big formation, but rather of small groups, or individual duels. Id say it boils down to riders and horses quality of training and cooperation


I think you're conflating the issue of mobility on the march and mobility in combat here. In a low-stress situation, a single horse and rider should have little problem negotiating terrain that a single human can walk through without scrambling. In combat, though, the horse (and rider) would have their attention split between the enemy, the terrain, and each other. The opposing infantrymen would have to split their attention between the terrain and the enemy, too, but at least the infantryman doesn't have to worry about falling off or injuring his horse (and he has no horse who needs to worry about not dropping or throwing its rider). When the terrain is reasonably flat and both sides have the freedom to move in all directions, the horseman obviously has the advantage simply by the fact that his horse allows him to pick the exact place and time of the engagement. But rough terrain reduces movement options in certain directions and the horseman's options are even more constrained than the infantryman's since a horse is physically larger (which means that it not only passively occupies more space but also needs more space to turn and change direction) and its centre of gravity is higher (even more so with a rider on its back). This isn't a problem on a route march or even an approach march with adequate protection from friendly security detachments because the horse and horseman would have the time to pick and choose viable routes. In a combat situation with the enemy placing further constraints on movement options and also forcing the horseman to take decisions in a hurry without taking the time to look around and consider alternative routes? I really don't fancy being the horseman in this situation -- I'd rather dismount just beyond the enemy's reach and engage them on foot if I don't have any supporting infantry that can do the job better.

Let's take your scenario of fighting in a narrow mountain pass. We've ridden up the pass to the enemy's positions and have charged them but failed to break them because riding uphill sapped our momentum and deadened the impact--but by the same token we managed to get into hand-to-hand combat with them without being skewered upon their spears or bayonets or whatever by that very same momentum. Pushing them further wouldn't do much good so our best option without dismounting is to retreat a short distance, let our horses catch their breaths, and attempt another charge. But we have to look at either our enemies (lest one of them run up and stab us while we're not looking) or the terrain we must withdraw through (lest we send our horse tripping over a large rock or a large dip or just an inconveniently steep slope). And let's not forget that the rough terrain has broken up our formation too, so we can't be sure that we'll have friends on either side to help us cover our withdrawal. Aren't we starting to regret the decision to attack mounted in the first place? It probably would have been better to avoid the enemy's troops and look for unguarded paths that would let us occupy dominating terrain (if they hadn't got there first), attack dismounted, or just make demonstrations to keep the enemy occupied while the other elements of our army win the fight in another place where the terrain doesn't put them at such a disadvantage.


Quote:
So the question might be: All being the same at the battle of Mortgarten, just substituting austrian knights with same numbers of roman legionaires, would these be more mobile and loose it less decisely, or even win?


Two words: Lake Trasimene.


Quote:
As far as cavalry closing in and dismounting, does this accounts for gunpoder/modern combat era, or as a whole? It seems pretty logical to dismount in difficult terrain to shoot at the enemy, rather than try to close in, hampered by terrain, being shot at from safe location, I also believe, that a man with missile weapon in difficult terrain will have a clear edge against any horseman, no matter how well trained. There also are examples of even heavily armoured cavalrymen dismounting to fight on foot, if stopped by some sort of fieldworks in difficult terrain, but would this really be the most effective and advisable way of fighting even in earlier era? Like heavily armoured knights dismounting and advancing uphills against entrenched enemy?


The thing is, heavy cavalrymen seldom went around on their own without the accompaniment of supporting troops with missile capabilities. High Medieval French and Anglo-Norman "doctrine" had the men-at-arms closely supported by crossbowmen. The English later on had longbowmen, while on the continent the crossbowmen kept their old roles, joined by handgunners and arquebusiers. Later on it was common practice to have "commanded Shot" (firearm detachments) sent out to accompany cavalry, and the dragoons themselves were originally developed to provide cavalry with an organic infantry support. So in most cases the men-at-arms wouldn't have had to worry about fighting mounted in disadvantageous terrain since they could just send their supporting infantry to shoot or assault the enemy infantry (or support their dismounted assault upon the enemy's positions). In fact, sometimes the heavy cavalrymen had some serious missile capabilities of their own (Parthian and Sasanian cataphrachts, Eastern Roman heavy cavalry, Tang or Ming Chinese cavalry, Mongol and Manchu elite cavalry).

And horsemen did dismount to assault enemy infantry in difficult terrain in some instances. Take the Franks who dismounted to assault a Viking camp in the marshes of the river Dyle in 891. Later at the battle of Sempach, Habsburg men-at-arms dismounted and attacked the Swiss vanguard with considerable success (although the terrain was perhaps not that difficult in this instance) before they were surprised and overwhelmed by Swiss reinforcements.


Quote:
I also find notion of cavalry riding somewhere and then dismounting, forming up as infantry and attacking the enemy as rather odd.


Note that I forgot to qualify the remark about this with "in difficult terrain." In open terrain where the cavalry had excellent freedom of movement, it would be pretty stupid to dismount except when the enemy had an overwhelming superiority in cavalry or when our cavalry needed infantry support in a hurry but there's no friendly infantry close enough to come up in time.


Quote:
If they are to act as dragoons, dismouting and proving missile support, like maybe was the original idea for archers of ordonnance companies, it seems reasonable, maybe even mounting few pikemen to give them some close support, or, regarding any other cavalry, maybe dismounting to occupy advantageous location, like village (like Poles at the battle of Hodow vs Tatars), but dismouting and advancing forward to meet enemy in close combat on foot?


Nobody said the dismounted attack has to be a frontal general attack. That's the point of using the cavalry's mobility -- it allows us to choose where and when we're going to attack, or at least to keep the enemy in doubt about exactly where we're going to strike (which is particularly great when our cavalry force is working in an economy-of-force role).


Quote:
What about horses in the rear? - easy target to be taken by enemy, unless significat portion of a force stays to guard them.


Yes, and that's a risk we need to balance against the risk of charging ahead on horseback over terrain bad enough to slow down and fragment our attack to the extent that we lose the advantages of momentum and mobility (while the disadvantages of being larger targets and having a higher centre of gravity get rather emphasised).

Remember, too, that a reserve and/or a rear security force would still be necessary even if we were to attack on horseback. Without a reserve, we'd have little hope of extricating ourselves if the enemy had prepared an ambush in addition to the position they've openly occupied to provoke our attack, or to clear our line of retreat if the mounted attack fails. And if our force is so small that we can't afford to keep part of it in reserve, it's probably too small to successfully assault the enemy in the first place -- especially when we have to attack them in terrain that will fragment our formation enough to force our men to fight individually in a confused melee against the enemy infantrymen!

Quote:
What about the time it takens to dismount and approach enemy on foot, how can that catch them off guard and unable to respond? And the dismounting itself in close proximity to the enemy might cause more harm, than good, battle of Monthlery might be a good example of what a confusion can cause, though this time the confucion was caused by remounting, not dismounting of burgundian force, which was eventually overwhelmed in disorder and routed.


Yes, and again that's a risk we have to balance against the potential problem of launching an ineffective (or even suicidal) attack on horseback.
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Sun 03 Aug, 2014 8:39 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Benjamin H. Abbott wrote:
Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
I also find notion of cavalry riding somewhere and then dismounting, forming up as infantry and attacking the enemy as rather odd.


English men-at-arms tended to do this during the Hundred Years' War, except that they did their best to avoid having to advance on foot.


Not always; at the battle of Agincourt they advanced first to provoke a French attack, and Monstrelet's account implied that the men-at-arms countercharged once the main wave of the French assault had come close enough. Later at Bauge (1421) and Cravant (1423) they attacked first against allied French and Scottish forces -- unsuccessfully at Bauge, but winning a significant victory at Cravant. Then at Verneuil (1424), the French cavalry on the wing attacked first and broke the English archers immediately in front of them, but they went haring off after English baggage while the English charged the French and Scottish infantry coming up from their front and routed them. The final and dramatic English defeat at Castillon (1453) also saw Talbot's Anglo-Gascon force attacking a fortified French camp bristling with cannon and firearms.


Quote:
Quote:
And I also just realized I forgot to post a link to the book arguing clear cut advantage of pistol armed reiters vs lance armed gendarmes in french religious wars, I apologize for that.(about page 290)


The funny thing is that French men-at-arms with lances perhaps had their last glory days during the Wars of Religion. While they may not have been the most economical option and had mostly disappeared by the end of the century, men-at-arms with lances proved potent on the battlefield during that period - especially during the first phases, such as Dreux 1562.


What I saw from the accounts and recommendations by pistol proponents (especially La Noue) is that pistol-armed heavy cavalry wasn't superior in and of itself, but the nature of the weapon and the deeper, more compact formations made it easier to build large and effective cavalry formations without demanding as much individual skill or training from the men (relying on formation drills and exercises instead). In a way, it might have been similar to Revolutionary and Napoleonic French cavalry, which was inferior to many of their enemies (particularly Austrians, Prussians, and even Mamluks) in individual or small-unit fighting but had an advantage in massive engagements.
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Sun 03 Aug, 2014 9:08 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Pieter B. wrote:
However he seems really adamant against heavy cavalry and thrash talks napoleons cavalry into the dirt. I recognize that the cavalry of Frederick the Great was both better in quality and better led/used, but was Napoleonic cavalry so rubbish as the author claimed? Did he truly just waste cavalry but throwing it against the enemy in endless waves until they finally collapsed?


Since I brought up Napoleonic cavalry just now in a different reply, I suppose this would be a good place to mention that Napoleonic French cavalry tactics and methods were definitely an acquired taste. Many of the best French cavalrymen and cavalry officers fled abroad in the Revolution, so the French had to build a strong cavalry force without the benefit of the emigres' pre-war experience. As a result, rival or allied nations who managed to keep their pre-war cavalry personnel and traditions usually found Revolutionary and Napoleonic French cavalrymen lacking in individual horsemanship and neglectful about the care of their horses, but still respected the French cavalrymen's ability to manoeuvre and strike in large masses thanks to Napoleon's obsession with large-scale drills and exercises.

So I suppose you can easily see why writers from other European nations, and indeed some later French writers who based their evaluations upon the mid- or late-19th century French cavalry (which had a great deal of excellent peacetime training, and performed well in the wars they participated in -- even the Franco-Prussian War), would have such a dim view of Revolutionary and Napoleonic French cavalry. It was effective, but it wasn't the kind of cavalry they were familiar with, so it was still rubbish in their eyes.
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Jaroslav Kravcak




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PostPosted: Mon 04 Aug, 2014 5:20 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

All are good points. (I pointed out things only from one-sided perspective, of course.)

Im rather referring to fairly open difficult terrain, not 4 men wide mountain pass, but quite uneven terrain, where still few tens of men maybe could march at once in single rank. Also, not counting something like attack on fortified camp on a mountain, or maybe in he marshes, or blocked road, or opportune counterattack at the right moment, where enemy isnt likely to get a chance to counterattack from another direction.

Talking about movement difficulties, the same stress applies to infantryman, he either runs around and watches for where he steps, or he is fully engaged in aiming his weapon, or something in between, on the other hand horse does the movement part (navigated by rider, but still placing his feet by his own judgement, or maybe even trained to move by himself), while rider does the hitting part. (So Id say both have it hard in high stress situation and broken terrain, maybe its just me, but I wouldnt dare to be occupied by something else, if i was walking through the broken terrain full of holes, for example, on the other hand, both having mobility severely obstructed, infantryman seems better off, as being small target, while rider needs to worry about as well, which he cant protect by mobility. I would prefer a horse, if i was at the level of horsemanship of peruvian passo, or portuguese rejoneador., if it was as sad as it is now with my riding skills, I agree, id like to dismount.)

What about cutting? These horses almost kneel, when turning, almost to the point of bringing point of gravity fairly close to that of dismounted man:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCRzUjn4I7I

Able horseman on well trained horse (as individuals, not in a unit) seems to be way ahead, of what knights horsemanship might be perceived from looking at average contemporary rider and horse. I still dont see approach on foot in same numbers as more safe, than approach on horseback, in anything, but really narrowed down space. (just from the point of how propable it is to get out alive, if things go wrong, not considering the effectiveness - though for retreat to be safe, only handfull of riders could attack at the same time propably, not to get stuck in a traffic jam.)

Also, if horses momentum is blunted charging uphills (bearing remark of much better mobiltiy uphills for a horse vs manin mind), how spent would a force of dismounted heavy cavalrymen be before they reach the enemy on top of a hill, even having to fight enemy with height advantage? (Thousands of french men at arms werent able to do this at poitiers, or Agincourt in more, or less even terrain.)

Maybe I have some facts wrong:

At the battle of Bauge, Duke Clarence and his men are generally said to charge on horse, not on foot. Is this wrong?

At the battle of Verneuil, after cavalry support was gone, english charged and broken the french, but how much actual resistance would there be from the french?

English achieved nothing at Castillon, barely getting atop french fortification and Sempach, in my view was the worst and most costly defeat for Austrians, or other knightly armies against the Swiss, compared to other engagements, where they fought mounted. (Once again, maybe this view is not valid.)

Its allways interesting discussion, I hope I dont sound, like I think I have all the answers, but I still see both options of fighting mounted, or dismounted as roughly equally good, or bad. Happy
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Lafayette C Curtis




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PostPosted: Mon 01 Sep, 2014 12:25 am    Post subject:         Reply with quote

Jaroslav Kravcak wrote:
Im rather referring to fairly open difficult terrain, not 4 men wide mountain pass, but quite uneven terrain, where still few tens of men maybe could march at once in single rank.


Then why bother dealing with dispersed single combat/melee? With that much space, it's probably much better to mass the cavalry and charge in a solid line (or column!) at a decent trot, fast enough to have some momentum but slow enough to let the horses deal with bumps and small obstacles in stride.


Quote:
Also, not counting something like attack on fortified camp on a mountain, or maybe in he marshes, or blocked road, or opportune counterattack at the right moment, where enemy isnt likely to get a chance to counterattack from another direction.


Unfortunately, these kinds of actions are exactly what small groups of cavalry are most likely to perform in scouting, screening, or raiding operations away from a larger main body (which in turn is the most likely scenario for the dispersed single combat you like to focus on in your discussions). If we ignore them in favour of "fair" head-to-head combat between cavalry and infantry on rough terrain -- which would have happened only a small fraction of the time -- that's as good as throwing the basic concept of cavalry operations out of the window.


Quote:
What about cutting? These horses almost kneel, when turning, almost to the point of bringing point of gravity fairly close to that of dismounted man:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCRzUjn4I7I


Fighting one-on-one (or one cavalryman against a few infantrymen who haven't trained to act together against a really good horseman, this kind of skill could be useful for setting up a good position to start the fight in, but I doubt the horseman would like to stay in such a low position once the combatants had come close enough to deal actual blows with their weapons -- it negates the horseman's advantage in height, which allows him to put more weight behind one-handed blows and thrusts. It'd also be a problem when there's more than one horseman involved in the attack -- the sight of an entire troop of cavalry trying to creep forward in this kind of posture isn't exactly likely to inspire fear in the enemy.


Quote:
Able horseman on well trained horse (as individuals, not in a unit) seems to be way ahead, of what knights horsemanship might be perceived from looking at average contemporary rider and horse. I still dont see approach on foot in same numbers as more safe, than approach on horseback, in anything, but really narrowed down space. (just from the point of how propable it is to get out alive, if things go wrong, not considering the effectiveness - though for retreat to be safe, only handfull of riders could attack at the same time propably, not to get stuck in a traffic jam.)


And that's exactly my point. If you want to give each rider enough space to fight effectively on an individual basis (or even a small-group basis), you'd only be able to send in a small number at a time -- which pretty much ensures that your attackers would be seriously outnumbered by the enemy infantry lurking in the rough terrain. That's not really the way to attack -- you want (and need) enough mass to overwhelm the enemy. Don't insist on attacking if the best you can do is only to even the odds (let alone when the odds are still in the enemy's favour no matter what you do to tip the scale).


Quote:
Also, if horses momentum is blunted charging uphills (bearing remark of much better mobiltiy uphills for a horse vs manin mind), how spent would a force of dismounted heavy cavalrymen be before they reach the enemy on top of a hill, even having to fight enemy with height advantage? (Thousands of french men at arms werent able to do this at poitiers, or Agincourt in more, or less even terrain.)


The difference here is that a dismounted attack would have more time and opportunity to measure and regulate the pace of its advance. It could march slowly, even stopping at intervals, and infantry doesn't really have to charge to put effective pressure on the enemy (as opposed to cavalry, which has to go fast or in a large close-order mass or both).


Quote:
Maybe I have some facts wrong:

At the battle of Bauge, Duke Clarence and his men are generally said to charge on horse, not on foot. Is this wrong?


The initial disastrous attack might have been made by mounted men-at-arms, but the lack of details in the sources means it's also possible that they dismounted before they assaulted the bridge held by the Scots (except for commanders and/or a small spearhead detachment that remained on horseback). There's also another, larger attack later in the day by dismounted archers, which also failed in breaking the Scots' defence but succeeded in recovering the Duke of Clarence's body.


Quote:
At the battle of Verneuil, after cavalry support was gone, english charged and broken the french, but how much actual resistance would there be from the french?


Not something that could be brushed away lightly, I wager -- the French weren't universally rubbish fighters, and I don't think the sources mention the English crushing the French with little or no resistance. But it's also worth noting that in this case, the attackers in the infantry fight (i.e. the English side) won, which gives the lie to the idea that the English "did their best to avoid having to advance on foot" or that a dismounted attack always puts the attacker at a disadvantage,


Quote:
Sempach, in my view was the worst and most costly defeat for Austrians, or other knightly armies against the Swiss, compared to other engagements, where they fought mounted. (Once again, maybe this view is not valid.)


Yet note how the dismounted Habsburg troops prevailed against the Swiss vanguard at first -- in fact, it'd be fair to say that they were doomed by their initial success, since by pursuing the defeated Swiss vanguard they put themselves in a position to be trapped and overwhelmed by the rest of the Swiss force.
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